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Happiness and public policy: a challenge to the profession 
 
Richard Layard1 
 
The theory behind public economics needs radical reform.  It fails to explain the 
recent history of human welfare, and it ignores some of the key findings of modern 
psychology.  Indeed these two failings are intimately linked: it is because the theory 
ignores psychology that it is unable to explain the facts. 
 
The fact is that, despite massive increases in purchasing power, people in the 
West are no happier than they were fifty years ago.  We know this from population 
surveys and other supporting evidence which I shall review. 
 
The most obvious explanations come from three standard findings of the new 
psychology of happiness.2  First, a person’s happiness is negatively affected by the 
incomes of others (a negative externality).  Second, a person’s happiness adapts quite 
rapidly to higher levels of income (a phenomenon of addiction).  And third, our tastes are 
not given – the happiness we get from what we have is largely culturally determined. 
 
These findings provide a challenge to the theory and conclusions of public 
economics, as set out for example in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).  The challenge to 
public economics is to incorporate the findings of modern psychology while retaining the 
rigour of the cost-benefit framework which is the strength and glory of our subject.3  In 
what follows I shall first review the measurement of happiness.  Then I shall take the 
three findings that I discussed one by one, and pursue the policy implications of each of 
them.  I shall end with some overall reflections. 
 
 
MEASURING HAPPINESS 
 
In the US the General Social Survey asks people “Taking things all together, how 
would you say you are these days – would you say you are very happy, pretty happy or 
not too happy?”  As Figure 1 shows, there has been no increase in happiness since the 
                                                 
1 This paper draws heavily on Layard (2005, 2005a and 1980). 
2 I do not include inconsistent behaviour which has been widely discussed (e.g. by Rabin, 1998) but is 
probably less important than the 3 findings discussed here. 
3 By public economics I mean the broad range of issues covered by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). 
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1950s – nor any significant decrease in unhappiness.  Similar findings apply in Japan and 
the UK and in most European countries (where the series began in 1975). 
 
You might reasonably question whether such remarks mean anything, but 
significant new evidence from neuro-science suggests that they do.4  Richard Davidson 
of the University of Wisconsin has identified areas in the pre-frontal cortex where the 
level of electrical activity is highly correlated with self reported happiness (both across 
people, and within people over time).  Moreover, even if the use of words has changed 
over time between cohorts, one would not expect it to change within a cohort – yet each 
cohort experienced a stable level of happiness since the 1950s despite huge increases in 
their purchasing power. 
 
There is also the cross-sectional evidence across countries – among industrialised 
countries with incomes over $20,000 per head there is no relation between average 
income and average happiness.  These inter-country differences do have real information 
content, since John Helliwell can explain 80% of the variance across 50 countries with 
only 6 variables.5  Finally, reverting to time series, there is the clear fact of increased 
criminal behaviour and the likelihood that depression has increased – no one thinks it has 
fallen. 
 
In due course we should have better time series on the happiness of the people, 
including neurological measurements, and clearer evidence on where are the real areas of 
unhappiness in our society.  But from what we already know we can conclude that over 
the last fifty years happiness in the West has not risen, though it almost certainly has in 
the Third World, where income has a much greater impact on happiness at both the 
individual and societal level. 
 
The finding about the West is contrary to standard economic theory.  For 
simplicity we can write standard theory as 
 
)  0u 0; u  (h) (y,u  u 21 〈〉=  
 
where u is (cardinal) utility, y is real income (which has risen) and h is hours (which have 
fallen for most people).  Clearly we need an expanded model of happiness if we are to 
                                                 
4 On this paragraph see Layard (2005) chapter 3. 
5 Helliwell (2003). The variables are: the divorce rate; the unemployment rate; the percentage of citizens 
who say that “most people can be trusted”; membership in non-religious organisations; the percentage of 
citizens who “believe in God”; and the quality of government (an index based on 4 sub-indices). 
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explain what is happening.  We need to incorporate the standard findings of modern 
psychology. 
 
 
SOCIAL COMPARISONS 
 
The most obvious of these is the fact that we compare our incomes with those of 
others.6  If others become richer, this reduces our satisfaction with whatever we have.  
The conventional wisdom is that people compare themselves mainly with people who are 
close to themselves in the income distribution, but if the income distribution is reasonably 
stable the income of this reference group will be proportional to average income )y( .7  
So an expanded theory could be for simplicity 
 
h)  ,y  -(y u  u α=  
 
In every study of happiness that I have seen average income )y(  attracts a large and 
significant negative coefficient.  This is so whether we use cross-sections of states or 
neighbourhoods or time-series (with time dummies).  In some studies the negative effect 
of average income is almost as large as the positive effect of own income.  There is also, I 
should add, no evidence that people compare their leisure with other people’s and some 
evidence that they do not.8 
 
The preceding model helps to explain the paradox that individuals seek higher 
income and get happiness from it (the correlation is about .15), while societies gain less 
from higher income than the isolated individual does. 
 
Many small pieces of evidence corroborate the validity of this analysis.  For 
example the US General Social Survey provides data on how the individual perceives his 
relative income.  If we regress happiness on own actual income and perceived relative 
income, the latter explains more than the former.  Similarly in Switzerland happiness is 
                                                 
6 For much evidence on this section see Layard (2005), Annex 4.1. 
7 This whole issue needs more study. For example, if people only compared their incomes with incomes 
above their own, the optimum tax would be more progressive than otherwise. It is also sometimes 
suggested that people are more concerned with their rank order in the income distribution than with their 
relative income. Experiments with the US General Social Survey suggest otherwise, but the case for 
corrective taxation would be similar whether people cared about rank or relative income (Layard, 1980, 
p.740). A third issue is the distinction between income and spending. Frank (1999) concentrates on relative 
consumption, and makes a further distinction between conspicuous and inconspicuous consumption. 
However the comparisons people make do also focus on income, and we do not yet have enough 
information to distinguish between these variants. 
8 Solnick and Hemenway (1998). 
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explained by income relative to income-aspirations, and the average income in the local 
community increases a person’s aspirations. 
 
 
Policy implications 
 
This is a case of negative externality.  To focus on the efficiency aspect of the 
problem we can assume there are n people who are identical, with the same happiness 
function and the same hourly wage of unity.  The socially optimal level of individual 
work effort (h) is now given by 
0  u 
n
1  un  - u 211 =+α  
Here the second term reflects the external disbenefit which comes from the rise in 
average income, which adversely affects the happiness of all n people.  Another way to 
think about this optimality condition is to ask: If everyone agreed with everyone else how 
hard to work in order to short circuit the rat race, how hard would they work?  Clearly the 
answer is given by 
 
 0  u   )-(1 u 21 =+α  
 
One way to coordinate this outcome is through a linear income tax with marginal rate t.  
The individual will work until 
 
0  u  t)-(1 u 2 1 =+  
 
So the marginal rate t which leads us to the social optimum is 
 
α t =  
 
It equals the cost to society expressed as a fraction of the gain to the individual.  
According to the studies I have quoted this might be quite substantial. 
 
This does not necessarily mean that taxes should be higher than they are now.  It 
does mean that they should be higher than they ought to be if there were no negative 
externality to be considered. 
 
We are talking here of a corrective tax – one that will reduce work effort to a level 
where the fruitless incentive to raise your relative income has been fully offset: the 
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external cost has been fully internalised.  This means that we need to rethink the 
measures of ‘excess burden’ that we use in cost-benefit analysis. The excess burden is 
normally calculated on the basis that any tax wedge of whatever size is distorting and 
reduces work effort below its efficient level.  But we now know that people would work 
too hard if taxes were zero.  So taxes only become distorting if they are levied above the 
optimum level to correct for the negative externality.  To assert otherwise is to fly in the 
face of a central and well-established fact of human nature. 
 
Libertarians object to this whole line of argument on the grounds that it panders to 
envy.  They do not apparently mind pandering to greed.  We should of course try to 
educate people away from both envy and greed, since neither is conducive to happiness.  
But at the same time we should set our other policy instruments at whatever level is 
optimal for the state of mind which currently prevails.  (We could never completely 
eliminate the drive for status since it is hard wired into our biology, as studies of male 
monkeys show: when a monkey is moved between groups so that his status rises, there is 
an increase in his serotonin, a neurotransmitter associated with happiness.9  The reverse 
happens when his status falls.) 
 
 
ADAPTATION 
 
A second key finding of psychology is adaptation.  All living organisms respond 
to external changes in ways that restore their internal balance.  This does not mean that 
for given genes there is a set-point of happiness which can only be temporarily disturbed 
– the clear evidence of explainable differences in happiness between societies refutes 
this.  So does the clear evidence of long-term changes in the happiness of individuals.10  
But adaptation does make it harder to secure permanent increases in happiness through 
increases in income. 
 
Survey evidence shows clearly that a rise in income raises happiness more 
initially than it does in the longer run.11  This is because income is in part addictive.  
Having once experienced a higher standard of living, we cannot revert to where we were 
before and feel the same as we did then. 
 
To allow for this effect we can add lagged income to the happiness function, with 
a negative effect.  Assume for simplicity that 
                                                 
9 Brammer et al (1994). 
10 Lucas et al. (2004). 
11 On this section see Layard (2005), Annex 4.1. 
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)   ,( 1 hyyuu −−= β  
Empirical work strongly supports this formulation, both in studies of happiness and of 
job-satisfaction.  In the US General Social Survey the change in income has more effect 
on happiness than does its level i.e. 5.0>β .  In the Swiss study I mentioned earlier 
lagged income is a major influence on income-aspirations, and this has been confirmed 
by numerous studies by Van Praag and his colleagues.  By contrast there is no evidence 
that people become habituated to good personal relationships, but there is less time for 
these when people work more. 
 
 
Policy implications 
 
Habituation to income is only a problem for public policy if this effect is 
unforeseen.  But there is substantial evidence that people over-estimate the extra 
happiness they will get from extra possessions.12  For simplicity assume there is no 
foresight: individuals do not realise that their current consumption will reduce their future 
happiness.  Robert Frank has called this a negative internality.  The result is that people 
will work too hard and consume too much.  To be rigorous, redefine y above to mean 
consumption.  Then if the rate of discount (d) for utility equals the interest rate and if real 
wages are constant, the efficient corrective tax rate is 
 
)1( dt −= β  
 
It is the same type of correction as for an externality, except that the damage comes one 
period later.13  The required correction is towards lower work effort and thus lower 
consumption.  But there is no required correction towards higher saving.  This only 
becomes necessary to the extent that real wages are rising. 
 
To the extent that addiction is foreseen the need for tax is less.  But much of the 
addiction to general spending, like the addiction to smoking, is not foreseen.  If we are 
willing to tax addictive substances, we should also be willing to tax other forms of 
addiction. 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Loewenstein and Schkade (1999), Loewenstein et al. (2003), Frey and Stutzer (2003) and Gilbert and 
Watson (2001). 
13 See Layard (2005a) Annex B which assumes an infinite time horizon See also Loewenstein et al. (2003). 
 6
RL425b  9 August 2005 
Loss aversion 
 
At this point we need to introduce a quite different consideration: loss-aversion.  
In the account we have given so far 
 
h)    βΔy, β)y -u((1  u +=  
 
whatever the sign of .  But important research by Kahneman and his colleagues shows 
that the effect on happiness of one unit of 
Δy
yΔ  is typically twice as great when yΔ  is 
negative as when it is positive.14  This means that the utility of income function is kinked 
at previous period’s income, reflecting a status quo bias or endowment effect.  And it is 
this kink which makes people so risk-averse.  This is a fortunate finding, for as Rabin 
(2000) has shown, it would be impossible without it to explain why the same people can 
be risk-averse to small risks yet willing to undertake very large ones if the expected gain 
is high enough.  Given the simplicity of this explanation of risk behaviour, it is time that 
the text books and the theory of finance stopped using an incorrect explanation. 
 
Clearly it is loss aversion which makes stabilisation policy so important.  If Lucas 
(2003) had used Kahneman’s estimates of this, he would have come to rather large 
estimates of the cost of fluctuations.15 
 
 
Adaptation and poverty 
 
Let me add one further comment on adaptation.  It clearly means that the function 
relating happiness to income is flatter in the long-run than in the short-run.  Existing 
studies support the idea that the marginal utility of income diminishes with income, both 
within societies and across societies.16  But the curvature is probably less in the long-run 
than the short-run.  If so, the optimum degree of equality is less than if we focussed on 
the short-run relationships. 
 
Some on the Left object to taking adaptation into account, just as some on the 
Right object to taking social comparisons into account.  Both arguments seem contrary to 
a humane philosophy which should both seek to modify human nature but also work with 
human nature as it is.  If there are some experiences which are totally impossible to adapt 
                                                 
14 Kahneman and Tversky (2000) p.58. 
15 Lucas (2003). 
16 Helliwell (2003). 
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to, like mental illness, and some like poverty to which there is partial adaptation, that 
information is relevant to policy and we should use it in determining our priorities for 
public expenditure.  At present our policies are based far too much on policy-makers’ 
judgements about how they would feel in a given situation, rather than detailed studies of 
how people actually feel.17 
 
 
TASTES 
 
Economics normally assumes that tastes are given.  This is clearly false in two 
senses.  First, social factors can affect our ordinal preferences – our indifference curves.  
But second, they may also affect the cardinal happiness we get from a given consumption 
bundle, even if they have no effect on our indifference curves.  Thus, as we have argued, 
average community income affects our happiness, as does our own lagged income.  But 
there are many other taste variables which I shall call T, so that now we are looking at: 
 
T)h,u(y,u =  
 
Good tastes are those which increase happiness, and vice versa. 
 
How far can public economics take into account the formation of tastes?  If it 
aims to provide a general framework for policy, it must do so.  I will give only three 
examples. 
 
The most obvious is advertising.  Though this can provide information, it almost 
always makes us feel we need more money than we should otherwise have felt we 
needed.  For example the US General Social Survey provides data on how a person 
perceives their position in the income distribution.  If we regress this estimate on a 
person’s actual income and the hours he watches TV, we find that watching TV makes a 
person feel poorer,18 and thus less happy.  The problem of advertising is greatest in 
relation to children, which explains why Sweden bans advertising directed at children. 
 
Another example is performance-related pay.  The theory in favour of this is 
blindingly obvious to most economists: we must align the interests of the agent with 
                                                 
17 Similar criticisms apply to QALYs which in the UK are based mainly on healthy people’s judgements 
about how they would feel if ill rather than studies of how ill people actually feel. A group of us are hoping 
to remedy this. 
18 Layard (2005), Annex 6.1. This result is unlikely to reflect only omitted variables. 
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those of the principal.  He must therefore be directly and rapidly rewarded for his 
performance.  The more we do this, the more we add to his motivation. 
 
But can we assume that his tastes will remain constant?  Probably not.  
Psychologists have done many experiments to examine the effect on a person’s inner 
motivation of increasing the external motivating factors.  Most of these studies show that 
extra financial rewards reduce internal motivation and can even reduce total motivation 
unless they are very large.19  It is easy to understand why – if someone pays you to do 
something, you may cease to feel you ought to do it anyway.  A simple example comes 
from an Israeli child-care centre.  To encourage people to pick up their children on time 
they fined parents who were late.  The result was that more people were late – they felt it 
was alright to be late since now they paid for it. 
 
However PRP is often a good idea when there is an unambiguous measure of 
performance.  But usually there is no such measure and individuals have to be ranked 
against their colleagues.  Often the rankings by different colleagues are poorly correlated.  
The effect of all this is to raise the salience of rank order comparisons in the utility 
function.  Relationships between colleagues become more strained as people strain harder 
to climb above each other on a ladder where the total number of places is fixed.  Since 
the extra pay is usually small, this additional stress can generally be justified only if 
shareholders or customers gain.  But, as I have suggested, these gains are uncertain.  
Economists should therefore be more humble before relying on the simple rationality 
postulate and recommending performance-related pay: they may well be changing tastes 
at the same time. 
 
Finally, let me take the most global aspect of our tastes – our feelings about what 
our life is about.  Economists offer a fairly clear view, if we leave aside the rare studies of 
altruism.  We say that each person seeks to be as happy as possible and the question of 
what makes him happy is unimportant.  For example it is not important whether it makes 
him happy to help other people or not.  (We then, according to Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
seek the optimum pattern of taxes and spending to maximise the social welfare function – 
always taking the individual utility function as given.) 
 
This is not of course how most people feel.  They think people’s values matter.  
That is one reason why we have compulsory education – because the utility functions of 
other people’s children put such obvious constraints on our own utility. 
                                                 
19 See Frey and Stutzer (2002), and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). 
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I am not suggesting that economists should become moralists.  But in some ways 
they already are, and their individualistic view of the world has gained increasing 
influence as belief has waned in conventional religion and in socialism.  Crudely the view 
which the public absorbs from economists is this.  Don’t expect people to be interested in 
anybody else beyond the family.  But don’t let that worry you, because the outcome will 
be as good as it could be, provided we establish the rule of law and the right tax / 
expenditure plan.20  Given that, let’s have the maximum of competition between firms 
and individuals. 
 
This involves a major confusion.  We do want the maximum of competition 
between firms, but not between individuals.  We want a lot of cooperation between 
individuals, for one reason above all – that life is more enjoyable that way.  Cooperation 
may also improve final output, but in many cases it will not – competition can be a 
formidable spur.  But the final output is only justified by its contribution to happiness.  A 
world where everyone else appears as a threat is unlikely to generate much happiness, 
even if it generates massive output. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I conclude that economics uses exactly the right framework for thinking about 
public policy.  Policy instruments are set so as to maximise the sum of (cardinal) utilities, 
with additional weight being given to those whose utility is low.  What is wrong is the 
account we use of what makes people happy.  Broadly, economics says that utility 
increases with the opportunities for voluntary exchange.  This overlooks the huge 
importance of involuntary interactions between people – of how others affect our norms, 
our aspirations, our feelings of what is important, and our experience of whether the 
world is friendly or threatening. 
 
One might wish to say that these things are the province of other social sciences.  
It would be convenient if life worked that way, as illustrated in Figure 2.  But it does not.  
We have already given important examples of this.  Or take mobility policy, illustrated in 
Figure 3.  More mobility certainly increases income but it also affects the quality of 
relationships in the community and in families.21  Economists should not advocate more 
mobility without considering these effects also. 
                                                 
20 Economists rarely suggest that businessmen should think directly about the interests of consumers as 
well as shareholders, on the implausible ground that if a firm did not maximise profits it would go 
bankrupt. 
21 For evidence see Layard (2005) p.179-180 and accompanying reference. 
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This requires collaboration between economists and other social scientists, 
especially psychologists.  In my view the prime purpose of social science should be to 
discover what helps and hinders happiness.  Economists could play a lead role in 
promoting this approach: there is so much that could readily be studied and has not been. 
 
Economists have much to contribute, especially cost-benefit analysis.  Eventually 
costs and benefits could perhaps be expressed in utils.  But for the present the money 
equivalent of a util will do fine, provided it is specified as the extra money which would 
in the long-run secure for the average person an extra util of happiness. 
 
Thirty years ago population surveys revolutionised labour economics.  A similar 
revolution will soon revolutionise public economics, when psychological data on 
happiness are at last combined with the insights of revealed preference.  This will lead to 
better theory, and to better policies. 
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Figure 1 
Income and happiness in the United States 
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Figure 2 
The policy-maker’s ideal world 
 
Figure 3 
“Reality” 
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